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ABSTRACT 
 
  
 
This paper analyzes a situation where multiple targets are exposed to a potential 
terrorist attack. The probability of an attack is determined endogenously in a game 
where a terrorist chooses the target while the targets independently determine the 
level of deterrence. As each target tries to divert an attack to others, the symmetric 
equilibrium becomes suboptimal and exhibits dispersion in the level of deterrence. 
The analysis shows that the first best deterrence level may be achieved when the 
targets can write a binding risk-sharing contract. Such a contract has limited 
applicability however as it suffers from a potential verification problem. 
 
 
 
 
본 논문은 테러리스트와 복수의 테러 대상자 사이의 전략적 행동을 게임이론을 통해 분석한
다. 기본모형은 테러리스트가 공격 여부와 그 대상을 선택하고 테러 대상자들은 각자 방어의 수
위를 결정하는 게임으로서 테러의 발생확률이 내생적으로 결정되는 구조를 가지고 있다. 균형
에서 테러 대상자들은 테러 공격을 서로에게 전가시키려 테러 방어에 과도한 투자를 하게 되며, 
동일한 테러 대상자들도 서로 다른 수준의 방어 수위를 유지하게 된다. 균형의 결과는 테러 대
상자들의 총합적 후생을 극대화하는 최적 선택에 비해 비효율적임을 보일 수 있는데, 이러한 문
제는 원칙적으로 테러 대상자들이 상호 간에 위험을 분담하는 계약을 맺음으로써 해결할 수 있
다. 하지만 그러한 계약들도 계약조건의 검증이 쉽지 않아 그 실효성에 제약이 있게 된다.  
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
A series of recent events has made terrorism a subject of increased academic 
interest. The dominant theme in the literature has been the analysis of various 
strategic interactions among the players in the scene. This article aims to provide an 
analytical framework that incorporates two of such interactions: the one between a 
terrorist and the targets and the one among the targets themselves. 
The model considers a situation in which many identical targets are exposed to a 
potential terrorist threat. The game starts when a terrorist observes the cost of 
operation. Comparing its cost and the benefit, the terrorist decides whether to initiate 
an operation or not. Each target invests in deterrence without knowing the terrorist’s 
decision. An operation is completed when the terrorist launches an attack against 
one of the targets. Two questions emerge naturally: i) is the outcome of the game 
desirable from the targets’ perspective?, and ii) if not, is there any way in which the 
targets can improve their fate? 
The answer to the first question turns out to be negative. The targets’ problem 
comes from two different sources. First, the targets do not internalize the negative 
externalities when they make their investment decisions. In equilibrium, each target 
tries to outinvest others knowing that the weakest target will be the victim of an 
attack. The possibility of this attack-diversion has been recognized in the literature 
(Sandler, 2003). When every target tries to undercut others, however, no target can 
actually succeed in the attempt. Consequently, they all end up playing a mixed 
strategy in the symmetric equilibrium of the game. Moreover, an attack occurs with 
a lower probability compared to the hypothetical case where the targets coordinate 
their actions. In other words, there is too much deterrence in equilibrium. 
The second problem facing the targets results from the fact that they cannot 
credibly commit to their actions. The idea, which dates back to Schelling (1960), is 
certainly not new. Given that the terrorist’s decision depends on his belief about the 
targets’ choice, the targets would do better if they could convince the terrorist that an 
attack is not likely to succeed. But this requires that the targets maintain an excessive 
level of investment even when the risk of an attack has been kept low. Such a strategy, 
however, will not be credible and hence cannot succeed in equilibrium. 
The targets can mitigate or sometimes even completely resolve the problem by 
writing a binding contract among themselves. Assuming that neither the targets’ 
investment nor the level of deterrence is verifiable, the only feasible contracts have 
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the form of a risk-sharing scheme. When the victim’s identity can be verified 
regardless of the outcome of an attack, such a contract can restore the efficiency as 
long as the first best does not require a complete deterrence. If the identity of a failed 
attack cannot be verified, however, the targets may achieve the coordination 
outcome but not the first best. It is argued that this verification problem becomes 
more severe when the targets involved are sovereign states rather than private parties. 
There is a growing literature on game-theoretic analysis of terrorism (Arce and 
Sandler, 2005; Heal and Kunreuther, 2005; Keohane and Zeckhauser, 2003; Konrad, 
2004; Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004; Siqueira, 2005). For a survey of earlier studies, 
see Sandler and Enders (2004). Most of existing literature focus on a single aspect of 
the strategic interactions such as the one among the targets, among the terrorist 
groups, or the one between a target and a terrorist group. A notable exception is Bier 
et al. (2007), which considers a model with a terrorist and two potential targets. In 
their model, the terrorist is assumed to pick a specific target at the same time when 
he makes the operational decision. This difference in modeling strategy is discussed 
further in the next section. By comparing the outcomes of a simultaneous and 
sequential move games, they show that the targets can enjoy a strategic advantage 
by moving first. But neither the commitment issue nor its potential remedies is 
explicitly examined in their article.1 
The idea that the government may correct the attack-diverting externalities by 
subsidizing terrorism insurance is explored in Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2005). But 
the strategic interaction between the terrorist and the targets is not analyzed 
explicitly in their model. Consequently, a budget-balancing subsidy scheme is 
shown to implement the first best, which is not the case in this article where the 
targets’ choice is constrained by the commitment problem. The techniques used to 
characterize the equilibrium distribution function are similar to those in Varian 
(1980). Due to the differences in the context, however, there are significant changes 
in the details including the construction of the support of the distribution function.2 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic 
                                                                                                                                                      
1 One of the games considered in Bier et al. (2007) has the same structure as the second- and third 
stage of the game analyzed in this article. In their set-up, the terrorist's preference is assumed to be 
a private information, which opens up the possibility that equilibrium may exist in pure strategies. 
They claim indeed that equilibrium must be pure, and characterize such an equilibrium. But their 
proof, which resorts to the convexity of the targets’ cost function, is incomplete at best. This is 
because the convexity cannot rule out a mixed equilibrium with a connected support although it 
does rule out an equilibrium with a “gap” in the support.  
2 More specifically, the fixed numbers of “informed” and “uninformed” consumers in Varian (1980) 
provide natural boundaries for the equilibrium support, which is not the case in this paper where the 
boundaries need to be determined endogenously from the targets' best response.  
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model. The symmetric equilibrium of the game is characterized in section 3. The 
welfare property of the equilibrium as well as the feasibility of contracting solution 
are analyzed in section 4. Concluding remarks follow in section 5. 
 
 
II. Model 
 
 
There is a terrorist group (= terrorist) and � � 2 potential terrorist targets (= 
targets). The game proceeds as follows. In the first stage, the terrorist draws a type 
� � ��, �� from a known distribution. The type determines the cost of carrying out a 
terrorist operation. After observing the type, the terrorist decides whether to start an 
operation or not. Neither the terrorist’s type nor his action in the first stage is 
observed by the targets. In the second stage, each target makes investment to 
enhance its capability to deter a future attack. In the third stage, the terrorist chooses 
a specific target and launches an attack.  
A target incurs a loss of � � 0 if an operation succeeds and zero if it fails. An 
attack against target � becomes a success with probability ��. Failure may occur 
either during the preparation stage of an operation or at the time of an attack. The 
first case arises because an operation may be detected before its completion. The 
second case includes a situation in which an attack is defeated by the target as well 
as the one in which failure occurs from a natural cause (e.g., a bomb does not go off 
due to malfunction).  
By investing in deterrence efforts, each target can reduce its success probability 
��. The cost of investment is given by a twice continuously differentiable function 
�����, which is strictly decreasing and convex. Three additional assumptions are 
made: i) lim��0����� � � � 0,  ii) � � lim��0����,  and iii) there exists a 
�max � �0,1� such that ���� � 0 for � � ��max, 1� and ����max� � 0. The first 
(second) condition is satisfied when the marginal (total) cost gets sufficiently large 
near � � 0. The third condition requires that both total and marginal cost become 
zero as � approaches 1.  
The terrorist maximizes the targets’ expected loss net of his cost of operation �. 
The terrorist’s type � � ��, �� is his private information but its distribution ���� 
is known to the targets. ����  is strictly increasing and twice continuously 
differentiable with 2����� � ������� � 0. The condition, which guarantees that 
the first-best solution is well-defined, is satisfied if the distribution function is not 
too concave. Two additional assumptions are made: i) �min �
�
�
� �max and ii) 
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�max �
�
�
.  The first (second) condition implies that an operation must be 
worthwhile (not worthwhile) for the terrorist when the cost is sufficiently small 
(large). It rules out rather trivial cases where either an attack never occurs or it 
occurs always in equilibrium.  
In the first stage, the terrorist decides whether to start an operation �� � �1� or 
not �� � �0�. Given that an operation has been initiated, the terrorist picks a 
specific target for attack in the third stage. In order to maximize the targets’ 
expected loss, the terrorist should attack the most vulnerable target. In other words, 
the terrorist will choose a target � if and only if  
 �� � max ��.   
When more than one targets have the highest probability of success, the terrorist 
is assumed to pick one of the targets randomly.  
In any Perfect Equilibrium of the game, the terrorist’s optimal decision in the 
third stage must be taken into account by the targets. Given that an attack occurs 
only when there is an ongoing operation, a target’s payoff depends on whether the 
terrorist initiated an operation or not. Let �� be target �’s total loss, i.e., the sum of 
the cost of investment and the expected loss from an attack. Then �� is given by 
 ����, �� � ����� � ������������ 
where 
 � � ��1, . . . , ��� 
 ���� � �
1 if � � �1
0 if � � �0
  
 ����� �
�
�
�
�
�
1 if �� � max
���
 ��
1
�
if �� � max
���
 ��, � � number of tied maximum
0 if �� � max
���
 ��
  
By setting the probability of success at ��, target � incurs a cost of �����. The 
second term in the expression, ��������1, . . . , ������, follows from the fact that 
loss from an attack materializes only when i) there is an ongoing operation 
�� � �1�, ii) target � is the weakest among � potential targets, and iii) the attack 
turns out to be successful. The joint loss of the targets is obtained by adding up the 
individual target’s loss: 
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 ���, �� � ∑  � ����, ��  � ∑  � ����� � ����max��1, . . . , ����. 
Targets are allowed to play mixed strategies. The strategy of target � then 
becomes a distribution function ����� with a support in �0,1�.  
In the first stage, the terrorist makes his operational decision. For a given cost of 
operation �, the terrorist should initiate an operation if  
 ������, �1�� � � � ������, �0�� 
or 
 � � ������, �1�� � ������, �0�� � ���max��1, . . . , ����� 
where the expectation is taken with respect to � � ��1, . . . , ���.  The optimal 
decision follows a cutoff rule: an operation is initiated if and only if the cost of 
operation does not exceed the targets’ expected loss from an attack.  
Since the targets do not observe the terrorist’s choice in the first stage, there is 
asymmetric information between the terrorist and the targets. The outcome of the 
game hence depends on how the targets form their beliefs about the state of the 
game in the second stage. The relevant equilibrium concept is weak Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium. It requires two conditions: sequential rationality and belief 
consistency. The first is satisfied if each player makes an optimal decision in every 
information set. The second condition requires that beliefs should be consistent with 
equilibrium strategies. Let � be the targets’ belief that there is an ongoing operation, 
i.e., � � �1. The equilibrium condition is then summarized as follows. 
 
Definition    The weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game is defined as follows: 
 
 i) �� � Pr�� � ��� 
 ii) � � �1 if and only if � � �� 
 iii) �� ��  �0,1�� ����, ������
��������
� ������� � �
� ��  �0,1�� ����, �������������
� �������  
for all � and ����� 
where �� � �  �0,1�� max��1, . . . , ������
����, ����� � �1���1� ����� �������, and  
���
� ����� � �1
���1� ����� ���1
� ����1����1
� ����1� ����� ��
�����.  
The first condition guarantees that the targets’ belief is consistent with the 
terrorist’s equilibrium strategy in the first stage. In equilibrium, the terrorist uses a 
cutoff rule to make his first-stage decision. For consistency, therefore, the targets’ 
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belief �� ��� must coincide with the actual probability of attack, which occurs 
when the terrorist’s cost is lower than the equilibrium cutoff �� ���. The second 
condition shows the optimality of the terrorist’s choice while the third condition 
gives that of the targets. The optimal cutoff is found where the terrorist becomes 
indifferent between the two choices �0 and �1. Each target should minimize its 
expected loss by choosing a distribution over �. Notice that the terrorist’s optimal 
decision in the third stage is subsumed in the second-stage game and hence omitted 
in the equilibrium definition. 
Before closing this section, it seems appropriate to add a brief remark on the 
modeling strategy. A distinguishing feature of the game examined in this article is 
that the terrorist makes his decision in two steps. In the first stage, the terrorist 
decides whether to participate in terrorist activities. Participation requires a sunk 
cost, which can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of doing the terrorism business. 
The decision in the third stage, on the other hand, is assumed to be tactical in nature 
which can be made flexible depending on the observed strength of the targets. 
The advantage of this approach is that it allows one to capture the two sources of 
inefficiency—attack-diverting externalities and commitment problem—at the same 
time. One can easily confirm this by examining the consequences of adopting 
alternative strategies. Consider first the case in which the third stage is merged into 
the first stage. This implies that the terrorist picks a target without knowing each 
target’s strength. Given that its strength cannot be observed by the terrorist, there 
will be no incentive for a target to out-invest others hence attack-diversion effect 
will disappear. If the first stage is merged into the third stage instead, the targets 
become the first-mover in the game and hence have the commitment power. By 
construction, the commitment problem does not arise in this case. 
 
 
III. Equilibrium 
 
 
The first step for characterizing the equilibrium is to show that an attack occurs 
with a positive probability, i.e., �� � 0. This can be easily shown by examining the 
implication of assuming the contrary. If the targets believe that an attack never 
occurs, there is no point of investing in deterrence. Therefore, only the success 
probabilities higher than �max must be played in equilibrium. But this implies  
 
 �� � �  �0,1�� max��1, . . . , ������
���� � �max�. 
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Given the assumption �max� � �, however, the terrorist should attack with a 
positive probability because Pr�� � ��� � Pr�� � �max�� � 0. This shows that 
the belief �� � 0  cannot be consistent with the terrorist’s strategy because 
Pr�� � ��� � �� in equilibrium. 
One of the distinctive features of the model is that a target can divert a potential 
attack to others. Consequently, each target has an incentives to slightly ‘undercut’ 
other targets’ probabilities. With every target trying to out-invest others, one may 
expect that an equilibrium in pure strategies would be difficult to sustain. It turns out 
that this is the case indeed. 
 
Lemma 1    There is no equilibrium in which the targets use pure strategies.  
 
Therefore an equilibrium, if exists, must be in mixed strategies. In a mixed-
strategy equilibrium, each target uses a distribution function to randomize over 
success probabilities. Although the model assumes that targets are identical, one 
cannot exclude in general the possibility that they use different distribution functions 
in equilibrium. To keep the analysis tractable, however, the following discussion 
will focus only on symmetric equilibria of the game where the targets use the same 
distribution function. Let ����� be the equilibrium distribution function. 
For an equilibrium to be sequentially rational, the game needs to be solved 
backwards starting from the last stage. Once the outcome of the third stage is already 
embedded in the targets’ payoff, the second stage becomes effectively the last stage 
of the game. The following lemma gives the first result regarding the targets’ 
equilibrium choice. 
 
Lemma 2    There is no jump in the equilibrium distribution function.  
 
Similar to the case with pure strategies, the intuition is again that a jump in a 
distribution function will provide an opportunity to undercut others’ probabilities. 
Without a jump, the distribution function becomes continuous and the probability of 
a tie becomes negligible. This makes it possible to express a target’s equilibrium 
loss in a much simpler form. For a given belief � � 0, it follows that  
 �� ��  �0,1�� ����, ����
����� 
    � �  �0,1�� ������ � �����1, . . . , ���������
���� 
    � �  �0,1� ������ � ��
�����
��1������
�����. 
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The first equality uses the definition �������� � �. The second equality follows 
from the fact that target � becomes the weakest among all targets with probability 
������
��1. 
Let �max��� � ���� � ���.  �max���  can be interpreted as the maximum 
possible loss of a target when it sets a success probability � with certainty. It is the 
sum of the investment cost ���� and ���, which equals the expected loss from an 
attack when a target expects to be the weakest for sure. Notice that �max��� is 
strictly convex given the assumption � ′′��� � 0. Associated with this function are 
the following two quantities � and �, which play a crucial role in the analysis: 
 � � argmin �max��� 
 � ��� � ���� � ���. 
 
Lemma 3    For a given �, � and � are uniquely determined. Both ���� and 
���� are continuously differentiable with respect to �.  
 
It turns out that the interval formed by the two values ��, �� becomes the 
support of the equilibrium distribution. A formal proof, which is given in the 
appendix, requires several steps of reasoning. The main intuition, however, comes 
from the basic property of a mixed-strategy equilibrium: the targets must be 
indifferent among all pure strategies played with a positive probability. In particular, 
this implies that a target should be indifferent between playing only the minimum 
and the maximum � in the support of the equilibrium distribution. Let �� ���� 
be the minimum (maximum) respectively. Since a target becomes the strongest 
(weakest) by setting � � �� �� � ���, it follows that ����� � ����� � ����. 
Assuming that there is no ‘gap’ between �� and ��, the support ��, �� can be 
verified by showing that �� � � and �� � �.  Given that �max��� is strictly 
convex and reaches its minimum at �, it is strictly decreasing (increasing) for 
� � � �� � ��. If the maximum �� does not coincide with �, then it must be 
that ����� � ���� � ���� � ���. If a target sets � � �, however, the expected 
loss will be at most ���� � ���  contradicting the assumption that � � ��  is 
played in equilibrium. A similar argument can establish the minimum �. Suppose to 
the contrary that the minimum �� is not equal to �. By construction, the expected 
loss at the maximum �� � �  is equal to the cost of investment at � , i.e., 
� ��� � ���� � ���. Given that ���� is strictly decreasing, however, this implies 
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����� � ���� � ���.  This is again a contradiction because it violates the 
indifference condition ����� � ����� � ����. The last step is to check whether 
there exists a gap in the support. The proof in the appendix shows that such a gap 
cannot arise in equilibrium given the convexity of ����. 
Once � is known to be the maximum in the support, it is straightforward to 
solve for the equilibrium distribution function. Given that the expected losses must 
be equalized across all �’s in the support, it follows that  
 ���� � ��������1�� � ���� � ���  for � � ��, �� 
or 
 ����; �� � ��������������
���
�
1
��1   for � � ��, ��.    
For a given belief �, therefore, the targets’ behavior is completely characterized 
by the distribution function ����; ��. 
In the first stage, the terrorist makes his decision expecting the targets’ choice in 
the next stage. An operation is initiated if and only if the cost of operation does not 
exceed the targets’ expected loss from an attack. The optimal cutoff is given by  
 �� � �  �0,1�� max��1, . . . , ������
����. 
The expression involves an order statistic max��1, . . . , ���,  which has a 
distribution function �����; ����. Then the optimality condition for the terrorist can 
be written in a simpler form as  
 � � �  �0,1� �����
���; ���
�
� �����. 
Notice that the dependency of the optimal cutoff on the targets’ belief is made 
explicit in the expression �����. 
The equilibrium of the game is found where the targets’ belief becomes 
consistent with the terrorist’s optimal strategy. This requires that the equilibrium 
belief �� should satisfy  
 Pr�� � ������� � � ��  �0,1� �����
���; ����
�
� � ��. 
Given that ���� is strictly increasing, the condition can be also written as 
 �  �0,1� �����
���; ����
�
� ��1���� 
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where ��1��� is the inverse of ����. 3  
 
Proposition 1    The symmetric equilibrium of the game is characterized as follows: 
 
 i) �� � �0,1� is uniquely determined by ��������� � �� 
 ii) � � �1 if and only if � � �� � �  �0,1� �����
���; ����
� 
 iii) ����; ��� is given by  
 ����; ��� �
�
�
�
�
�
0 � � ��
�
���
�
�����
�������
����
�
1
��1
� � ���, ���
1 �� � �
  
where ��  is implicitly defined by � ���� � ����� � �����  and �� �
argmin ���� � ����.  
 
 
IV. Analysis 
 
 
From the targets’ perspective, the outcome of the game is not satisfactory for two 
reasons. In equilibrium, each target tries to divert an attack to others, which results 
in a dispersion in the level of investment. The joint expected loss may be reduced 
further if the targets can coordinate on their efforts. In addition to this coordination 
problem, the targets suffer from a commitment problem that keeps them from 
achieving the first-best outcome. Given that the probability of an attack depends on 
the terrorist’s belief about the targets’ investment, the targets could lower their 
expected loss if they could commit to a high level of investment. But such a scheme 
requires that the targets should maintain the investment high even when the risk of 
an attack remains low. The targets’ strategy will fail, therefore, unless they have a 
proper mechanism to support the commitment. 
                                                                                                                                                      
3 Although the symmetric equilibrium of the game is completely characterized by the proposition, 
technically it is not unique in the usual sense. Given that the targets’ strategy involves mixing, any 
distribution function that differs from ����; ���  on a set of measure zero will also be an 
equilibrium strategy. Hence, the uniqueness in this case should be the one among these equivalent 
classes of functions.  
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To identify each of these issues separately, two hypothetical models are 
considered in the following analysis. The first model assumes that the targets can 
coordinate their investments but cannot commit to a certain investment level. The 
second model allows for both coordination and commitment. The analysis then 
proceeds to examine whether contracts can be designed to eliminate the two types of 
inefficiencies.  
 
1. Equilibrium with Coordination 
 
The terrorist and the targets play the same game as before except that the targets 
minimize the joint expected loss by coordinating their actions. The targets’ strategy 
is to choose a joint distribution function ���� defined on an �-dimensional unit 
cube �0,1��. Notice that this allows for the possibility that two or more targets’ 
choices are correlated with each other. There is no change in the terrorist’s problem 
in the first- and the third stage of the game. 
When coordination is allowed, the targets must set the same investment level 
across all targets. Given that only the weakest target will be attacked by the terrorist, 
investing more in one target than in others would be simply meaningless. More 
formally, 
 
Lemma 4    In any equilibrium with coordination, the targets choose p 1 � �2 �
. . . � �� with probability 1.  
 
Without loss of generality, therefore, one may restrict attention to a one-
dimensional distribution function to examine the targets’ problem. Then the joint 
expected loss can be written as  
 �  �0,1� ������ � ���������. 
The integrand is strictly convex hence has a unique minimum. Let ����� �
argmin ����� � ���. This implies that the joint expected loss will be minimized if 
����� is set across all targets. 
The terrorist’s choice in the first stage follows a cutoff rule. The optimal cutoff 
has a simple form in this case:  
 ����� � �  �0,1�� max��1, . . . , ������
���� � ������. 
The equilibrium of the game is determined by finding a consistent belief �� that 
satisfies  
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 Pr�� � ������� � ��������� � ��. 
 
Proposition 2    The equilibrium with coordination is characterized as follows: 
 
 i) �� � ���, 1� is uniquely determined by ��������� � �� 
 ii) � � �1 if and only if � � ������ � ��� 
 iii) the targets set �1 � �2 �. . . � �� � �� � ��min, �max� with probability 1 
where �� � argmin ����� � ����.  
 
The difference with the equilibrium in the basic model is that now the targets 
internalize the attack-diverting externalities by coordinating their actions. As a 
consequence, the investment becomes equalized across all targets and hence the 
dispersion in deterrence level is no longer observed in equilibrium. Another 
interesting feature of the equilibrium is that an attack becomes more likely when 
coordination is allowed, i.e., �� � ��. The lack of coordination leads to an over-
investment in deterrence efforts. 
 
2. Equilibrium with Coordination and Commitment 
 
Although coordination will certainly help, it does not exhaust all the possibilities 
for improvement. The targets’ problem with coordination is given by   
 min
�
 ����� � ���. 
The targets minimize the joint expected loss taking their belief � as given. But 
the probability of an attack, which must coincide with the targets’ belief in 
equilibrium, depends on the terrorist’s belief about the targets’ action. This suggests 
that the expected loss could be reduced further if the targets were able to control the 
terrorist’s belief directly. 
Consider a modified game where the targets can commit to their choice before 
the terrorist makes his first move. The rest of the game is the same as before and the 
targets are assumed to coordinate their decisions. In the new game, therefore, there 
is an additional stage in which the targets are allowed to make their commitment. 
The outcome of the modified game depends on whether such a commitment can 
be made credible by the targets. A commitment will have no effect in equilibrium, 
for instance, if the targets can costlessly withdraw from whatever claim they made in 
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stage zero. This implies that the targets will discard any previous commitment that 
requires a suboptimal action in the second stage. The only credible commitments in 
this case must be the ones that would have been chosen in the second stage even 
without making them in the first place. 
If there is a way to make a credible but non-trivial commitment, however, the 
targets can have a strategic advantage over the terrorist. Suppose that such a 
commitment has been made by the targets in stage zero. Since the investment must 
be equalized across all targets with coordination, one may restrict attention to a 
common success probability �. Given that the commitment is credible, the terrorist 
will initiate an operation if and only if the cost of operation � does not exceed its 
benefit ��. Then an attack will occur probability Pr�� � ��� � �����. But this 
must be expected by the targets in the commitment stage. The targets’ problem then 
becomes  
 min
�
 ����� � �������. 
The objective function correctly reflects the fact that the targets’ choice changes 
the probability of an attack in equilibrium. Committing to a lower � will influence 
the terrorist’s belief and hence decrease the probability of an attack. In equilibrium, 
therefore, the targets will invest more in deterrence compared to the case where only 
coordination is allowed. 
 
Proposition 3    The equilibrium with coordination and commitment is  
characterized as follows: 
 
 i) �� � �0, ��� is uniquely determined by ����� � �� 
 ii) � � �1 if and only if � � �� � ��� 
 iii) the targets set �1 � �2 �. . . � �� � �� � ��min, ��� with probability 1 
 where �� � argmin ����� � �������.  
 
Compared to the case where only coordination is allowed, the targets invest more 
in deterrence when they can also commit to their actions. An attack becomes less 
likely as a result and it may even become totally prevented ��� � 0� in equilibrium. 
In either of the two previous equilibria, on the other hand, an attack always occurs 
with a positive probability. As will be shown shortly, however, a complete 
deterrence turns out to be quite difficult to achieve in practice. 
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3. Contracting 
 
The analysis so far has shown that the targets may improve their fate if they can 
successfully coordinate and commit to their actions. Given that each target has an 
incentive to pursue its own interest at the expense of others, what remains to be 
shown is exactly how they may achieve the coordination and commitment. 
The answer will be rather straightforward if the targets can write a binding 
contract on their investment. If a contract requires that each target should invest to 
set �� � ��, the first-best will be attained as long as a large enough penalty is 
imposed for a breach. To implement the contract, however, the court should be able 
to verify the investment made by the targets. The problem is that the investment, 
which may include the amount of “efforts” as well as monetary spending by the 
targets, will be difficult to measure and hence to verify. Alternatively, a contract 
could be written directly on ��’s. But verifying them in court will not be an easy 
task either. 
A more realistic approach would be to write a contract based on the outcome of 
an attack. A contract then must specify a transfer payments between the victim and 
the rest of the targets. The payments will depend on the three contingencies of the 
game: i) an attack occurs and succeeds, ii) an attack occurs but fails, and iii) no 
attack occurs. Let ���� be the payment made by the victim (other targets) after a 
successful attack and  ����′� be the payment made by the intended victim (other 
targets) after a failed attack. If an attack does not occur, there is no victim to be 
treated differently. Define � to be the payment imposed on all targets in this case. 
A payment can be negative, which will be the case if a target receives a transfer 
from others. 
To make such a contract enforceable, the identity of the victim needs to be 
verified. It will be easy to identify the victim once damage has been made by an 
attack. It may not be so, however, when an attack has been attempted but failed. 
There are two cases to consider. If the attack was defeated by the target on site, the 
identification will not be much of a problem. If the operation has been detected 
before completion, on the other hand, verifying the incident let alone the intended 
target could be problematic. In the following analysis, the optimal contract will be 
characterized first under the assumption that all three contingencies can be verified. 
The case when the second and the third contingency cannot be differentiated will be 
discussed later. 
Without any restrictions on the structure, a contract may specify transfer amounts 
that are not consistent with each other. For instance, it may happen that a target is 
entitled to a positive transfer that exceeds the amount of payments made by the rest 
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of the targets. This motivates a concept of budget-balancing contracts. More 
formally, a contract is called budget balancing if the payments of all targets sum up 
to zero in each contingency. This implies that a budget-balancing contract must 
satisfy three conditions: i) � � �� � 1�� � 0,  ii) �′ � �� � 1��′ � 0 , and iii) 
�� � 0. An immediate consequence of this restriction is that � must be equal to 
zero, i.e., there should be no transfer among the targets in case an attack has not 
occurred. 
Consider a situation where the targets play the same game as in the basic model 
except that now they can write a binding contract before the terrorist makes his first 
move. The question is whether there exists a budget-balancing contract that can help 
the targets achieve their first-best. It turns out that such a contract does not exist.  
 
Proposition 4    Suppose that �� � 0. Then the first best can be implemented by 
a budget-balancing contract. In such a contract, �� � 0.  
 
The fact that an optimal contract should set �� � 0  has an interesting 
implication. Given the budget-balancing condition, this means that �� � ��� �
1��� � 0, i.e., a contract should specify a positive transfer to the ‘victim’ of a failed 
attack. To enforce the clause, however, the court must be able to verify whether 
there has been such an attempt, and if so, the identity of its intended target. As is 
pointed out earlier, however, verifying a failed attack may not be an easy task 
especially when the operation failed because it was detected before completion. 
To examine the consequences of this problem, suppose now that the victim’s 
identity cannot be verified in a failed attack. Then a contract must specify the same 
transfer payment for all targets in case there has been an unsuccessful attempt by the 
terrorist, i.e., �� � ��. But this implies that �� � �� � 0 because the payments 
must satisfy the budget-balancing condition �� � �� � 1���.  
 
Corollary    Suppose that �� � 0. If the victims cannot be verified in failed 
attacks, there is no budget-balancing contract that implements the 
first best.  
 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The analysis has shown that the commitment problem faced by the targets makes 
it difficult to eliminate terrorism risk completely. Absent an imminent threat, targets 
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cannot be expected to make sufficient amount of deterrence efforts, which makes 
them vulnerable to a potential terrorist attack. Although complete deterrence may 
not be optimal for the targets, this finding does exemplify the limitations of 
defensive counterterrorism policy. 
Contracting turns out to be an effective instrument that can be used to mitigate 
the targets’ problem. An implicit assumption, however, is that such a contract will 
be signed by all of the targets exposed to a common terrorist threat. Even though the 
contracting is to achieve a collective good, reaching an agreement may not be an 
easy task especially when many parties are involved in the process. Moreover, for a 
contract to function properly, it must contain a clause that penalizes a party who 
withdraws later. Otherwise, every target will find it irresistible to withdraw from the 
contract and slightly undercut the other targets. Such a deviation will be profitable 
because, with only a minor increase in the deterrence investment, the deviant will 
never incur the loss from an attack nor the transfer payment to other targets. If the 
targets involved are subject to a common authority, the problem may be resolved by 
making the participation mandatory. Examples would be private parties in a single 
country and local/state governments under a federal government. If the targets 
involved are different sovereign states, however, participation must be voluntary. 
Without sufficient contractual penalties, therefore, cooperation will be difficult to 
maintain in this case. 
Another issue regarding the implementation of an optimal contract is that it 
requires the verification of the victim’s identity in both successful and failed attacks. 
The victim needs to be rewarded in a failed attack because it will provide additional 
incentive for deterrence, which is necessary to achieve the first best. Verifying the 
victim could be problematic, however, especially when a failure is caused by 
detection instead of defeat. Given that verification matters to the extent that it affects 
the targets’ incentives, the problem will become most severe when the targets’ 
deterrence depends heavily on detection rather than defeat. But detecting terrorist 
operations, which requires sophisticated intelligence capabilities as well as the 
authority to apply them, is mainly the responsibility of the government. This 
suggests that cooperation might be more difficult to achieve among different 
countries than among private parties in a single country. 
Terrorism is a complicated subject which involves multidimensional strategic 
interactions. This article examines two of such interactions in a unified framework. 
Although the analysis is carried out in a stylized model with a single terrorist group 
and multiple identical targets, the main finding—resolving the coordination and the 
commitment problem at the same time is in general difficult—seems to be robust. It 
would be of interest to see whether a more sophisticated mechanism can be found 
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which may improve upon the simple contracts considered here. 
From a counterterrorism perspective, this article deals only with defensive 
measures as opposed to proactive measures (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004). A more 
complete picture will be obtained if both types of measures are incorporated into the 
model. Such analysis will be best performed in a dynamic setting where terrorists 
and targets interact over time. The approach adopted in Keohane and Zeckhauser 
(2003) seems particularly promising in this respect. These are some of the questions 
left for future research. 
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Proof of Lemma 1 
 
Suppose not. Then there exists a �� � ��1�, . . . , ��� � such that target � sets ��� 
with probability 1 in equilibrium. It suffices to consider the case �� � 0. Notice 
first that max
�
 ��
� � �max  in this case .  If max
�
 ��
� � �max,  the target with the 
highest probability may reduce its expected loss by choosing max
�
 ��
� � �. This is 
because, for a small enough � � 0, the expected loss from an attack will decrease 
while the cost of investment will remain constant. But this in turn implies that 
��
� � �� for all �. To confirm, suppose to the contrary that ��� � max�  ��
� for some 
�.  Then target � ’s cost of investment must be strictly decreasing for �� �
���
�, max 
�
��
�� because ��� � max�  ��
� � �max. This means that target � can lower 
its expected loss by setting ��� � ��� � � instead of ���. As long as � � 0 is small 
enough to satisfy ��� � � � max�  ��
�, target � can reduce its cost of investment by 
����
�� � ����
� � ��  without changing the probability of being attacked. The 
assumption ��� �  max�  ��
�  hence leads to a contradiction. Hence, the only 
remaining possibility becomes ��� � �� � �max for all �. But this is not consistent 
with equilibrium, either. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists. Then the expected 
loss of each target must be ����� � 1
�
�����. If a target undercuts �� by � � 0, 
however, it can divert a potential attack to others with probability 1. The total 
expected loss will become ���� � ��, which will be smaller than the equilibrium 
loss ����� � 1
�
����� for a small enough � � 0. □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
 
The proof is essentially the same as the one in Varian (1980). Suppose that there 
is a jump at �. Since there can be only countably many jumps in any probability 
distribution, it is possible to find a small � � 0 such that a jump does not occur at 
� � � . Consider a deviation strategy where a target �  sets � � �  with the 
 
 
Appendix 
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probability with which he used to set �, and sets � with probability zero. The net 
gain from such a deviation becomes 
 Pr��� � � for some � � ������ � Pr��� � � for some� � ����� � �� 
 �Pr��� � � for all � � ������� � ����  
 �Pr��� � � � � for all � � ������ � �� � ��� � ���� 
� �  
��1
��1
Pr��� � � for all � � �, � other targets set �� � � for � � �� ����� � �
�
� � 1
�� 
 � �  
��1
��1
Pr��� � � for all � � �, � other targets set � � � � �� for � � ����� � ��. 
As � converges to zero, the sum of the first four terms converges to zero but the 
sum of the last two terms remains positive. This leads to a contradiction because the 
deviation strategy leads to a lower expected loss than the assumed equilibrium 
strategy. □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
 
Given the assumptions lim��0����� � � � 0 and ����max� � 0, the first-order 
condition for the minimization problem is satisfied as an equality in �0, �max�. In 
other words, there exists a � � �0, �max� such that 
 ����� � �� � 0. 
This follows from the fact that the function ����� � ��  is continuous with 
lim��0�
���� � �� � lim��0�
���� � � � 0  and 0 � ����max� � �� � ��.  Since 
the objective function is strictly convex, such a � must be the unique solution to the 
minimization problem. Given that �����  is strictly increasing, the first-order 
condition can be rewritten as 
 � � ���1����� 
where ���1��� is the inverse of �����. ���� must be continuously differentiable 
with respect to � given that ���� is twice continuously differentiable. 
For a given �, it is straightforward to show that � � �0, �� is also uniquely 
determined. The assumption � � lim��0���� implies 
 lim
��0
���� � � � ���max� � ��max� � ���� � ��� 
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The second inequality follows from ���max� � 0 and 0 � �, �max � 1 while 
the third equality uses the fact � � argmin �max���.  Since ����  is strictly 
decreasing with ���� � ���� � ���, there must be a unique � � �0, �� such that 
� ��� � ���� � ���. Given that ���� is continuously differentiable, so is ����, 
which is a continuously differentiable function of �. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
The following claim 1 through claim 5 establish the first part of the proposition. 
Define ���� � ���� � �������1���.  Let supp����  be the support of the 
distribution function ����,  i.e., supp���� � ��: ��� � �� � ��� � �� �
0 for any � � 0�. 
 
Claim 1    For all ��, ��� � supp�����, ����� � ������.  
 
Proof Suppose not. Then there exists �̂ � supp����� such that  
 ���̂� � min
��supp�����
���� � �. 
Notice that the support of a distribution function is closed (see Chung, 1974). Given 
that supp����� � �0,1� is also bounded, the minimum on the right-hand side is well-
defined. Let � � ��: � � argmin �����.  Given that ����  and �����  are both 
continuous, ����  is also continuous. This means that there exists an interval 
��̂ � �, �̂ � ��  such that for all � � ��̂ � �, �̂ � ��,  ���� � �.  Notice that �̂ � 
supp����� implies ����̂ � �� � ����̂ � �� � 0. Consider a deviation strategy which 
assigns probability 1 to a � � �. The net gain from such a deviation is given by  
 �  �0,1� ������
���� � � � �  �0,1� ����� � ����
���� � �  �����,����� ����� � ����
���� � 0 
which contradicts the assumptions that ����� is the equilibrium strategy. □ 
 
Claim 2    ����� � 1 and �� ��� � 0.  
 
Proof Define pm � min p � suppF��p�  and p� � max p � suppF��p�. 
Suppose to the contrary that ����� � 1. This implies �� � �. Given that � � 
supp�����, the equilibrium expected loss is given by  
 ����� � ����� � ��������1���� � ����� � ����. 
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Recall that �max��� � ���� � ��� is strictly increasing in � for � � �. If a 
target deviates by playing � � � with probability one, the net gain becomes  
 ����� � ���� � ���� � ����� � ���� � ����� � ���� � 0 
which contradicts the assumptions that ���� is the equilibrium strategy. A similar 
argument establishes �� ��� � 0.  Assuming �� ��� � 0  implies �� � �.  Then 
the equilibrium expected loss must be equal to 
 ����� � ����� � ��������1���� � �����. 
But a target incurs at most ���� � ��� � � ���  by playing � � �  with 
probability one. Therefore, net gain from such a deviation becomes at least  
 ����� � � ��� � 0 
given that ���� is strictly decreasing. Again, this contradicts the assumption that 
����� is the equilibrium strategy. □ 
 
Claim 3    ���� � �� � 1 for any � � 0.  
 
Proof Suppose not. Then it follows that p� � p. Then the equilibrium expected 
loss must be equal to ����� � ����� � ����. Consider a deviation strategy that 
assigns probability one to � � �. Notice that �� � � implies ���� � ���� � ���. 
Given that �max��� � ���� � ��� is strictly decreasing in � for � � �, the net gain 
from such a deviation becomes 
 ����� � ���� � ����� � ���� � ����� � ���� � 0 
which leads to contradiction.    
Given that � �  supp �����,  it follows that ���� � ����  for all � � 
supp�����.  The equation ���� � ����  implicitly determines the equilibrium 
distribution function �����: 
 ���� � ���� � �������1��� � ���� � ��� � ���� 
 ����� � ��������������
���
�
1
��1. 
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To confirm that ����� satisfies the requirements for a distribution function. 
Notice first that �� ��� � 0, ����� � 1. Also, for � � ��, ��   
 ��
����
��
  � � 1
��1
�����
2��
��1
��������������������
��2�
 
 � � 1
��1
�����
2��
��1
�������������������������������
��2�
� 0 
where the inequality follows from ���� � ��� � ���� � ��� and ����� � �� �
0 for � � ��, ��. □ 
 
Claim 4    �� �� � �� � 0 for any � � 0.  
 
Proof Suppose not. This implies pm � p. Then the equilibrium expected 
loss must be equal to ����� � �����.  Given that � � �� �  supp �����, 
however, the equilibrium expected loss must be equal to ���� � ���. But this 
leads to a contradiction because 
 ����� � � ��� � ���� � ��� 
given that ���� is strictly decreasing. □ 
 
Claim 5    ������� � ������ � 0 for all � � �� � ��� � �.  
 
Proof Suppose not, i.e., there exist �� , ��� � ��, �� such that ������� �
������ � 0  and �� � ���.  Let �� � �� � ��, �� : ����� � ������ � ��������  be 
the preimage of ������. Given that the function ����� is continuous, the set �� 
must be closed. Then �� � min � � ��  and �� � max � � ��  are well-defined. 
By construction, it must be that �� � �� � ��� � ��  and ��, �� �  supp�����. 
Then the equlibrium expected loss is equal to  
 ����� � ��������1���� � ����� � ��������1����. 
Let ����� � ���� � ��������1���.  Given that ������ � 0,  the function 
����� is strictly convex with ������ � ������. This implies ����� � ������ 
for all � � ���, ���.  If a target sets any � � ���, ���  with probability one, 
however, the expected loss becomes ���� � ��������1��� � �����,  which is 
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smaller than the equilibrium expected loss ������. This contradicts the assumption 
that ����� is the equilibrium distribution function.  
For the second part of the claim, let Δ���� � �������� � �. Then Δ����� � 0. 
Notice that  
 ����� � �  �� �����
���; ���
�
� �� � � �  �� ��
���; ���
�
�� 
where the last equality follows from integrating by parts. Given that ����, ����, 
and �����; ���
�  are all continuous in �, Δ���� is also continuous. Given the 
continuity of Δ����, the existence of �� is proved if one can show that Δ��1� �
0 � lim��0Δ
����.  To see this, notice first that the equilibrium distribution 
�����; ���
� becomes degenerate at � � �max as � � 0. This implies  
 lim
��0
Δ���� � lim
��0
� ��  �0,1� �����
���; ���
�
� � ���max�� � 0 
where the inequality follows from the assumption �max� � �.  Moreover, 
� � �max implies  
 ���1� � �  �0,1� �����
���; 1��
�
� ����� 
therefore,  
 Δ��1� � �����1�� � 1 � ���max�� � 1 � ���� � 1 � 0 
where the last inequality follows from the assumption �max� � �. 
To prove the uniqueness of ��,  it suffices to show that Δ����  is strictly 
decreasing in �. Using the envelope theorem to evaluate ���������
��
� ��, one can 
show that  
 ���
���;���
�
��
� �
�
��1
�
�������������
���
�
1
��1 ���������
�2��
� 0 
Given that ���
���;���
�
��
,
�����
��
,  and 
�����
��
 are all continuous, ��
����
��
 can be 
evaluated using Leibniz’s integral rule. This leads to 
 
 ��
����
��
 � �����
��
� � �����; ���
� �����
��
� � ��� ��; ���
� �����
��
� � � �  ��
������;���
�
��
�� 
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 � �� �  ��
������;���
�
��
�� � 0 
given that ����; �� � 1  and �� ��; �� � 0 . Since ��
��
� 0,  it follows that 
�Δ����
��
�
��
��
���
��
� 1 � 0 as claimed. □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
 
Suppose not, i.e., there exists a set �� � ��: �� � �� for some �, ��  and 
Pr�� � ��� � 0. For each � � ��1, . . . , ���, define �� � max��1, . . . , ����1, . . . ,1�. 
Consider an alternative strategy where the targets set �� with the probability with 
which they used to set �. The gains from such a strategy is given by 
 �  �0,1�� �∑  � ����� � �max��1, . . . , ���������� 
 � �  �0,1�� �∑  � ��max��1, . . . , ���� � �max��1, . . . , ���������� 
 � �  �� �∑  � ������ � ��max��1, . . . , ����������� � 0 
since ∑  ���1 ������ � ��max��1, . . . , ����� � 0  for � � ��  and Pr�� � ��� � 0. 
This implies that a strategy where Pr�� � ��� � 0 is never optimal, which leads to 
a contradiction. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 
First, it is shown that there exists a unique �� � �0,1� satisfying the belief-
consistency condition. Notice that the first-order condition for the targets’ 
minimization problem holds as an equality, i.e., ������� � �� � 0  given that 
lim��0��
���� � �� � lim��0�
���� � � � 0  and �����max� � �� � 0.  Since 
����� is strictly increasing, this implies ����� � ���1 �� ��
�
�. where ���1��� is the 
inverse of �����.  �����  must be continuous and strictly decreasing given that 
���1��� is continuous and strictly increasing. Let Δ���� � �������� � �. Then the 
equilibrium belief ��  must satisfy Δ����� � 0. Notice that Δ���� is continuous 
and strictly decreasing given that ����� � ������  is continuous and strictly 
decreasing while ���� is continuous and strictly increasing. This implies that the 
solution to the equation Δ���� � 0, if exists, must be unique. Given the assumption 
� � �max� � �,  the solution does exist because Δ��0� � ���max�� � 0  and 
Δ��1� � �����1��� � 1 � ���max�� � 1 � 0.  If �� � 0,  it must be that 
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�����max� � �
�� � ��� � 0. This means �� � �max. Also ���min�� � ���� �
0 implies �min � ��. 
To see that �� � ��, it is helpful to define ��  such that ��������� � ��. 
Since ���� and ���� are both continuous with ����0��� � ���max�� � 0 and 
����1��� � 1 � ���max�� � 1 � 0, such a �
� � ��, 1� is uniquely determined. 
Then it must be that �� � ��. To confirm, suppose to the contrary that �� � ��. 
Given that � ��  �0,1� �����
���; ����
�
� � ��, it follows 
 � ��  �0,1� �����
���; ����
�
� � ��������� � �� � �� � 0. 
Since ���� is strictly increasing, this implies �  �0,1� ����
���; ����
�
� �����. 
Notice that the distribution function �����; ���
� has a support �����, ����� and 
����  is strictly decreasing in �.  This implies �  �0,1� ����
���; ����
�
� ����� �
�����, which is a contradiction.  
A similar argument can be used to establish �� � ��. To see this, suppose to the 
contrary that �� � ��. Given that ���������� � ��, it follows  
 ��������� � ���������� � �� � �� � 0. 
Since ���� is strictly increasing, it must be that ����� � ������. Consider 
����� and ������. From the first-order conditions,  
 ����������� � ��� � 0 
 ��������� � ��� � 0. 
which implies ����������� � ���������.  But this leads to ����� � ������ 
because ����� � 0 is strictly increasing. Given that ���� is strictly decreasing and 
����� � ������, it follows that �� � �� , which is a contradiction. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Characterizing the equilibrium boils down to showing that there exists a unique 
�� � ��min, �
��. Then �� � �0, ��� follows immediately because �min � �� � �� 
implies 0 � ���min�� � ������ � ������ � �� . To see that ��  is uniquely 
determined in ��min, ���, notice first that it is never optimal to set �� � �min. The 
probability of an attack becomes zero once � reaches �min. If the targets set � 
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below �min, therefore, they will increase the cost of investment without lowering 
the probability of an attack. Similarly, any �� � �max cannot be optimal, either. 
Otherwise, the targets will be able to reduce the risk of an attack without any extra 
costs of investment. Without loss of generality, therefore, the domain for the targets’ 
minimization problem can be restricted to � � ��min, �max�. 
Given the assumption 2����� � ������� � 0, the targets’ objective function is 
strictly convex for � � �min because  
 �
2���������������
��2
� ������� � 2�������2 � ���������3 
 � ������� � �2������ � �����������2 � 0. 
This implies that the solution to the minimization problem must be unique. In 
contrast to the equilibrium with coordination only, however, the first-order condition 
may not hold as an equality. Differentiating the objective function with respect to � 
gives  
 ������ � ��������2 � ������ � Γ���. 
The second derivative is shown to be positive, which means that Γ��� is strictly 
increasing. There are two cases to consider: i) Γ��min� � 0 and ii) Γ��min� � 0. 
If Γ��min� � 0, the objective function is increasing for all � � ��min, �max�. This 
implies that the minimum is attained at � � �min. If Γ��min� � 0, the first-order 
condition holds as an equality, i.e., there exists a �� � ��min, ���  such that 
Γ���� � 0. To confirm, notice that  
 Γ���� � ������� � ����������2 � ������� � 0 
because ������� � ������� � 0. Given that Γ��� is continuous with Γ��min� �
0 and Γ���� � 0, such a �� � ��min, ��� must exist. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
 
For a given contract ��, �, ��, ���, a target’s loss is given by 
 ����, �� �  ����� 
 �I�s� �ρi����pi�D � B� � �1 � pi�B�� � �1 � ρi���� �max
��i
 p�b � �1 � max
��i
 p�� b
��� 
The difference with the basic model is that a target incurs a loss (or a gain, if the 
payment is negative) even when it is not the victim of an attack. The loss of a target 
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will depend on whether it is the victim of the attack and also whether the attack was 
successful or not. The second term on the right-hand side then gives a target’s 
expected loss from an attack. The joint loss of the targets can be obtained by adding 
all individual losses: 
 ���, �� � ∑  � ����� � ���� �max
�
 ���� � � � �� � 1��� � �1 � max
�
 ��� ��
� � �� � 1����� 
 � ∑  � ����� � ����max
�
 ��� 
Due to the budget-balancing conditions, the transfer payments cancel each other 
out once they are summed up across all targets. Consequently, the expression for the 
targets’ joint loss is exactly the same as the one in the basic model. Given that the 
terrorist cares only about the targets’ joint loss and not its distribution, this implies 
that contracting does not change the terrorist’s objective function, either. 
Given a contract, the equilibrium of the game is found where the terrorist and the 
targets play their optimal strategies and the targets’ belief becomes consistent with 
the terrorist’s equilibrium strategy. To differentiate it with the equilibrium without 
contracting, ���, ���, and ������� will be used to denote the equilibrium belief and 
the strategies. 
 
Lemma 5    In any equilibrium with contracting, ��� � 0.  
 
Proof Suppose to the contrary that ��� � 0, i.e., the targets believe that an 
attack never occurs in equilibrium. Then it is never optimal for a target to choose a 
� � �max with a positive probability. This implies  
 ��� � �  �0,1�� max��1, … , ������
����� � �max�. 
Notice that the belief consistency requires ����������� � ���. But this leads to 
a contradiction because  
 0 � ��� � ������ � ���max�� � ���� � 0 
where the last inequality follows from the assumption � � �max�. □ 
Recall that the first best may require �� � 0, i.e., there should be no attack by 
the terrorist. The lemma show therefore that the targets’ problem cannot be solved 
entirely by contracting. The question is then whether the targets may achieve the 
first best if it does not require a complete deterrence. A necessary condition is given 
by the next lemma. 
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Lemma 6    If ���� � ���  for all i, then ����� � �� � �1 � ������ � ���� �
�1 � ������.  
 
Proof Suppose not. Then there are two cases to consider: i) ����� � �� �
�1 � ������ � ���� � �1 � ������  and ii) ����� � �� � �1 � ������ � ���� �
�1 � ������. In the first case, a target may deviate by setting �� � ��� � � for a 
small � � 0. By doing so, the target becomes the strongest target with certainty. 
The net gain from the deviation becomes 
 ������� � ������ � ��� ��1
�
����� � �1 � ������ � ��� � �1 � ������ 
 ���� 1
�
������ � �� � �1 � ������ � ��� � �1 � ������ 
As � gets smaller, the first two terms approach zero but the last term remains 
positive. This contradicts the assumption that ���  is the targets’ equilibrium 
strategy. A similar argument can be applied to the case ����� � �� � �1 �
������ � ���� � �1 � ������. One may consider a deviation �� � ��� � �.  The 
deviant becomes the weakest target in this case. Then the net gain is given by  
 ������� � ������ � ��� 1
�
������ � �� � �1 � ������ � ���� � �� � �1 � ������ 
 ���� ��1
�
����� � �1 � ������ � ���� � �� � �1 � ������ 
As � becomes smaller, the first two terms approach zero but the last term 
remains positive. Again, this leads to a contradiction. □ 
The meaning of the condition becomes clear once a target’s objective function is 
examined more closely. If the targets set the same ��� in equilibrium, which must be 
the case if the equilibrium achieves the first best, target �’s expected loss is given by 
��������, ���
�� , ���
� �
����� � �
������� � �� � �1 � ����
�� if �� � �
��
����� � �
�� �
1
�
����� � �� � �1 � ����� �
� � 1
�
���� � �1 � ����
��� if �� � �
��
����� � �
������� � �1 � ������� if �� � �
��
  
The function ��������, ����� , ��� is continuous except for a potential discontinuity 
at �� � ���.  Conditional on there being an attack, a target incurs a loss of 
����� � �� � �1 � ������  if it is the victim. Otherwise, the loss becomes 
���� � �1 � ������. Hence the condition in the lemma requires that a targets should 
be indifferent between being and not being the victim of an attack. If not, a target 
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will deviate by slightly lowering (or raising) its � to get the better payoff. Once the 
condition is satisfied, the function ��������, ����� , ��� becomes continuous for all ��. 
A contract induces the first-best if ���� � ��,  i.e., each target sets ��  in 
equilibrium. Then it must be that  
 ���� � �� � �1 � ����� � ��� � �1 � �����                         (1) 
For the strategy to be optimal, any deviation must result in higher expected loss. 
Examining the target’s expected loss reveals that setting any � � ��  is never 
profitable. Given that all other targets set ��, lowering � unilaterally will only 
increase the cost of investment without changing the probability that an attack 
becomes successful. 
A deviation by setting a � � ��, on the other hand, may reduce a target’s 
expected loss. One way to prevent such a deviation is to align the optimality 
condition of individual targets with the one that minimizes their joint expected loss. 
Assuming that an attack occurs with a positive probability, i.e., �� � ������ � 0, 
the first best solution is determined by  
 ������� � ������� � ����������2 � 0 
or 
 ������ � ������ �
�
�1 �
�������
������
���� � 0                            (2) 
On the other hand, a target’s expected loss will be minimized at ��  in 
equilibrium if it is increasing in �� for all �� � ��. Differentiating the function 
��������, ���
�� , ���  with respect to ��  and evaluating it at ��� � ��  gives 
������ � �
��� � � � ���. This implies that a target will never deviate from the 
first-best solution if  
 ������ � ���� � � � ��� � 0 
for �� � ��. Given the convexity of ����, the left-hand side of the inequality 
increases with ��. Hence the condition will be satisfied for all �� � ��  if the 
inequality holds at �� � ��, i.e., 
 ������ � ���� � � � ��� � 0 
Comparing the expression with �2� reveals that this inequality is reduced to 
 � � � � �� � �
�
�1 �
�������
������
����                                  (3) 
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By construction, the first best can be supported as an equilibrium if a contract 
satisfies �1� and �3� along with the two budget-balancing conditions. As long as 
other targets are doing the same, it will be optimal for a target to set � � ��. Given 
the targets’ strategy, the terrorist should initiate an operation only when � � �� �
���. The targets’ belief �� is then consistent with the terrorist’s strategy because 
�� � ������. Given that the condition �3� is in inequality form, however, the 
optimal contract is not determined uniquely. In case �3� holds as a strict inequality, 
each target's expected loss must be strictly increasing at � � ��. This implies that 
the targets would reduce their expected loss further if they could collectively choose 
to lower their �’s. Then a strong refinement in the spirit of Aumann (1959) may 
eliminate such a possibility and hence resolve the indeterminacy. 
Now, for the proof of proposition 4, notice first that any budget-balancing 
contract that implements the first best must satisfy  
 � � �� � 1�� � 0 
 �� � �� � 1��� � 0 
 ���� � �� � �1 � ����� � ��� � �1 � ����� 
Solving for �, �, and �� gives,  
 � � �
�
�
1���
��
�� 
 � � ��� � 1�� � ��� � 1� ��
�
�
1���
��
��� 
 �� � ��� � 1��� 
Then the expected loss of target � can be expressed in terms of �� only. Given 
that �� � �� for all � � �, this gives 
 ����� � ������� � �� � �1 � ������ 
 � ����� � ���� �
�
�
� �� � 1�
��
��
� � ���� � 1��� � �����; �
��. 
For �� � �� to be optimal, �����; ��� must be increasing in �� at �� � ��, i.e.,  
 ��
����;���
���
� ������ � �� �
�
�
� �� � 1�
��
��
� � 0. 
It is easy to confirm that the inequality holds as an equality at 
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�� �
1
����1�
�������
������
�����2 � 0.  Given that ��
����;�
��
���
 is increasing in ��,  this 
implies that any contract with �� � 1
����1�
�������
������
�����2 can support the first best 
given that �, �, and �� are determined accordingly. □ 
 
Proof of Corollary 
 
For the contract to implement the first best, it must satisfy �1�, which is now 
reduced to   
 � � � � �. 
Combined with the remaining budget-balancing constraint � � �� � 1�� � 0, 
the contract can be determined completely, which is given by  
 � � �
�
 
 � � ��� � 1� �
�
. 
Then it is straightforward to verify that the contract does not implement the first 
best. This is because the contract violates �3�, i.e.,   
 � � � � �� � � � �
�
�
�
�
�1 �
�������
������
����. □ 
